This is the first installment of a four-part essay examining lessons learned from Ukraine for SOF in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Authored by Erik Kramer and Paul Schnieder. Subscribe to the SOFX Report to follow the full series.
SOF Imperatives
Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization
“We have to cancel tonight’s training mission.” The Ukrainian company commander of the unit we were instructing told us late in the afternoon. We were speechless. We had been planning this culminating exercise for two weeks. I asked why and he said the buses to take the company to Bakhmut arrive in the morning. Fast forward a month and we received a text from a SOF company commander we had trained who was sitting in a trench in Bakhmut. He asked if we had an English translation of a French/German Milan anti-armor weapon instructions manual. He had received the weapon with a manual in French and his internet coverage was spotty when he tried to look it up on YouTube. Such are the challenges training and advising partner forces in Ukraine.
P
urpose: This paper will focus on lessons learned for U.S. SOF. The authors have strived to make it generic for all SOF forces, but our backgrounds are in Army Special Forces so our writings will have a “Green Beret” lean to it. We also will try to not focus on lessons learned that are only applicable to Ukraine and the capabilities and capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
This paper will also focus on Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and not Irregular Warfare (even though there are elements of it in here) or the type of operations that U.S. SOF have conducted over the past twenty years.
Background: We spent the past two and half years in Ukraine training and advising their military. We worked with every type of ground unit with the exceptions of the Naval Infantry, the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU or commonly known as the SBU using a transliterated acronym from the original Cyrillic alphabet). The major combat formations in the AFU include the following forces under the Ministry of Defense: HUR, Ground Forces (Regular Army), SOF, Naval Infantry, and the Territorial Defense.
The following formations are under the Ministry of the Interior: the Border Guards Service, Combat Police, and the National Guard. Of note, Ukraine has partisan forces operating in Russian-occupied areas that have had some major successes with sabotage and targeted assassinations and they have a significant social media presence. When AFU units are deployed to the “line of contact”, you will find Army brigades or National Guard brigades with elements of many different forces under them, sometimes as small as a company.
The use of the term SOF within the AFU is used loosely. The National Guard has SOF units and the Border Guards Service has specially trained units as well. And of course, there is the regular SOF that fall under their own chain of command. The HUR plays a significant role with their SOF units and is often cited in the news for their lightening raids. The SBU conducts SOF missions as well. The SBU has similar missions to both the U.S. CIA and FBI. SOF units are often used as infantry to fill gaps in the line; a role that they are not trained and equipped for. The main missions that AFU SOF conduct would fall under are direct action and special reconnaissance (partisan forces also conduct these type of missions well as sabotage and intelligence gathering operations).
Unmanned systems play a significant role in all SOF operations and in many of the missions, unmanned systems are the main effort. AFU SOF is often assigned missions that it is not trained for and that are considered traditional infantry missions. One of the outcomes is a high casualty rate and constant loss of experienced operators. Also sometimes SOF operations are “nested” under strategic goals, but other times they go where they are needed on the battlefield. Their bravery is beyond reproach and their actions, especially at the beginning of the war, kept the Russians from taking Kyiv.
From 2014-2021, U.S. and Allied SOF were in Ukraine developing their special operations forces. A fact that is not well known outside of the U.S. and Allied SOF communities. That training ensured that many of the operators at the beginning of the war were trained and understood how to conduct SOF operations.
We organized this paper with a focus on what is important to SOF. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ Warfighting Functions are a good way to organize major components and we have used them in previous papers, but SOF have unique considerations given unit size, limited assets, and focus on the human element and intelligence.
This article is organized with the following categories: planning, operations, and training and under subcategory, we first note relevant “observations” from the war in Ukraine followed by “recommendations” for USSOF. Under operations, we focus on four core SOF missions, Direct Action (DA), Strategic Reconnaissance (SR), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
We further organized this paper along the lines of “SOF Warfighting Functions:” infiltration and maneuver; fires; unmanned systems; intelligence and the human domain; communications/cyber/information/electronic warfare (EW) operations; logistics/medical; and evasion. At the end of this article, we have included links to relevant resources, vignettes, and articles.
I. Planning
Observations
SOF is a strategic asset and should be used to directly support strategic missions. But SOF also, throughout most of its history, has been a supporting effort used to support conventional forces. SOF mission will support a strategic objective or line of effort, but also have missions that are “nested” under conventional missions to help shape efforts. In Ukraine, many of the tactical missions that SOF conducted were not nested or had a direct correlation to an effort they were supporting. That was not the case with all missions, but we witnessed it often and it depended upon the unit. We are not going to identify specific units or missions out of respect as well not to inadvertently violate operational security. Part of USSOF planning, especially for those conducting FID, is detailed programs of instruction that are relevant to the partner force.
One of the complaints from Ukrainians trained by foreigners, especially outside of the country, was that the training was not adapted to the battlefield in Ukraine, culture of the AFU, and the reality of the experience and organization of the AFU (we will discuss this in greater detail in the “training” section of article Part 4).
When we first trained AFU SOF, their commander requested a full Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) course just like at Ft Leavenworth (MDMP is a highly structured and detailed, step-by-step process to plan operations). It was painful and did not go well, so over the course of a year, we modified the planning process to what would work in Ukraine (I want to credit co-author former SF officer, Paul Schneider, for leading the effort to modify U.S. planning methods to fit the needs of the AFU and the realities on the battlefield. I was skeptical at first, but it worked).
Specifically, during the planning process, we restructured the staff into functional areas. For example, for specific aspects of the plan, such as route planning, medical, and logistics, we combined intelligence, operations, logistics, and medical staff sections. For intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and fires, we combined intelligence, communications, and fires staff sections. We only permitted analog planning methods (and forbid PowerPoint slides). It helped the students focus on the process instead of the product(s) such as perfect PowerPoint slides.
We also did steps sequentially instead of simultaneously. Those techniques facilitated rapid planning and prevented the “siloing” of information. This process was compatible with the Ukrainian military staff culture where everything is done sequentially. We only allowed one-two courses of action given the limitations on staff experience and small staffs (sometimes one man only staff sections).
The war gaming was done in sequence by phase with all staff stating their actions for that phase to create shared understanding and unity of effort. It also served as a rehearsal of concept that followed synchronized timelines side-by-side (which we required the staffs to visually display prominently). Great care was also focused on detailed schemes of reconnaissance because of a systemic lack of shared common operations picture platforms and disrupted communications due to EW. Of note, the AFU has developed a software called DeltaCOP that provides a common operating picture on tablets, phones, etc. which is very effective, but not every unit has them.
Traditional Russian (and Ukrainian) operations and planning at the battalion level and below looks more like a battle drill. The units have a “list” of preplanned and rehearsed operations that everyone understands such as a “battalion attack” or “defend”. The strengths and weaknesses of this system are obvious. A strength is everyone understands the plan, the weakness is there is no flexibility built into the plan nor is the plan tailored to the enemy capabilities, terrain, etc. That is one reason that their major exercises are choreographed with no “free play.” When SOF is working with partner forces, they must first understand the military culture in order to properly advise them or make improvements.
Planning timelines are very abbreviated in Ukraine, the AFU does not have the luxury of plenty of planning time. Most tactical missions are “immediate” and a reaction to a Russian action. As a result, most planning is “hasty” and planners are not able to conduct NATO, MDMP-style planning as mentioned above. USSOF could very easily face a similar situation in LSCO.
The war in Ukraine is partly fought on social media; not just with news, but commanders and subordinates communicating via Whats App or Telegram. The partisans, specifically the group Atesh, uses social media to recruit, communicate, and as an information operations platform to tout their successes. Also incoming rocket and drone attacks are immediately broadcasted on Signal, and on a special app. It literally can save your life. Social media monitoring should be part of the planning process and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Recommendations
Detailed planning is one of the hallmarks of SOF and one of the ways it makes up for less personnel and firepower on missions. In LSCO, the pre-mission planning and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process should emphasize several consequential areas. This includes a detailed analysis of social media and what are the popular channels. Prior to deployment, all personnel should download the most popular social media apps, become familiar with them, and subscribe/follow the more popular channels.
Area studies will be incredibly important, for not only Army Special Forces but Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, and Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Raiders. LSCO, whether it is in the plains of Europe or the hilly terrain of Taiwan, will be complicated and messy. Operators must understand the different parties, allegiances, and motivations of areas that they will be operating in. In Ukraine, the further east that you go, the more Russian sympathizers you will encounter and even in Taiwan, the population’s commitment to take up arms against a Chinese invasion has been mixed depending upon which survey you view.
Other recommendations include shortening the planning and targeting processes once you are in country. Operations and the enemy situation changes so quickly, the days of being able to plan an operation for 24-48 hours are long gone. Direct action missions will have to be planned and executed quickly; especially along the line of contact. Focusing on more simple plans (especially as attrition and protraction leads to staffs with less and less training or experience), synchronizing timelines, detailed reconnaissance, and rehearsals are the way to proceed. We taught the Ukrainians also how to plan enroute using techniques that SOF use for Time Sensitive Targets “TSTs” or changes of mission while doing an operation when they were given no time to plan.
When conducting any type of instruction or foreign internal defense, a bread and butter U.S. Army Special Forces mission, instructors must first really learn how the students plan, train, fight, what equipment they actually have etc. and ask a lot of questions, especially the “why” things are done a certain way. It is insulting to your students to not ask them first and just to immediately teach Western ways. In Ukraine, we had soldiers that we were teaching (in 2022) who had been in combat since 2014. They had plenty to teach us! One example is we were teaching movement techniques and wedge formations to a SOF unit. The company commander pulled the instructors aside and said that they only move in file columns (ducks in row) because of the danger of landmines as well as butterfly mines caught in the trees falling on top of them when it is windy. Safer to clear one narrow path. This method also mitigates the challenges of these students then having to adapt lessons after training (if they even have time before going to the front) to their unit’s specific mission, equipment, and laws.
You have to adapt the program of instruction to the realities of the available time and resources (especially training ammunition). Niceties such as testing and remedial training are not realistic when the soldiers have two weeks to train and are deploying to Bakhmut the day after training is complete.
Little details matter. One SOF unit we habitually worked with, trained with USSF in another country, but made a point to say that the Ranger Handbook they used was from the 2000s. Part of the planning process should include an analysis of their previous experience. Within the AFU, one finds highly experienced soldiers and brand-new recruits who have never fired their weapons, even in a SOF unit.
SOF operations are often a supporting effort or shaping effort for conventional operations; especially in LSCO. This statement was a fact of life prior to Afghanistan and Iraq. With that said, USSOF must ensure they conduct “adjacent unit” coordination with conventional forces in their area of operations (whether they own the battle-space or not). Lack of adjacent unit coordination in Ukraine is a problem with conventional forces and SOF. The adjacent unit coordination goes beyond telling conventional units where and when SOF will be conducting missions. It also ensures that the missions, if not directly tied to a strategic mission, outcome, or objective, should supplement and reinforce conventional force missions.
One example in a LSCO fight, is a conventional Army division or brigade conducting breaching operations. SOF operations in the enemy’s rear area or the “deep fight” beyond the Forward Edge of Battle and Security Zone could disrupt enemy command and control nodes, destroy indirect fires systems, limit avenues of approach, separate civilians from military targets, and delay the introduction of reserve forces onto the battlefield.
SOF intelligence operations can support conventional fights with timely intelligence such as a deep reconnaissance mission of forces in an enemy’s rear area prior to a corps or division attack to verify or deny enemy courses of action and determine their order of battle. U.S. Army corps no longer have long range surveillance units. Also cavalry units at the brigade level are being deactivated. The only force left to fill that gap is SOF. Prior to the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, conventional and SOF worked closer together in the Balkans.
Each Army corps had a Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD) which was a permanent staff element led by a colonel whose mission was to be the primary SOF advisor to the corps commander. When deployed together, there was an organization called a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), often led by a Special Forces company commander, that would command and control all SOF elements in the conventional forces area of operations and often SOF units were under the tactical control (TACON) of the division commander.
SOF still will have to be the main effort in counterterrorism operations and have central roles in irregular warfare, but once conflict crosses the threshold to LSCO, SOF needs to be prepared to revert back to a supporting role. It needs to be planned and rehearsed in training exercises with conventional forces in order for both forces to understand how to employ and complement each other. Interoperability and SOF/conventional force integration used to be buzzwords that were used often. In order to stay effective and not be misused or underutilized in a LSCO, SOF needs to reaffirm those ties to conventional forces and remember they might be a supporting effort in that fight. Do not forget that one of the SOF Imperatives is, “Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations.” The ability to integrate with conventional forces demonstrates that legitimacy.
II. Operations
Infiltration/Maneuver
Observations
Infiltration, especially behind enemy lines presents a challenge because of the constant surveillance from UAS. With many of the UAS equipped with thermal optics, even the night does not always provide stealth. In addition to counter UAS equipment, the Ukrainians are also relying on smaller unit formations, speed, and subterfuge to conduct operations in a UAS saturated environment.
Most of the SOF/partisan operations in the occupied areas have mainly been intelligence gathering and targeting information. Ukrainian security services and partisans have conducted isolated assassinations and sabotage, but not on a large scale due to the Russian occupying forces highly effective population control measures and foreign intelligence services. The Russians are very good at counter-resistance efforts through fear, intimidation, and violence.
During combat operations, most maneuver forces are 30 Soldiers maximum with just a handful of vehicles. Both sides have used motorcycles, ATVs, and even scooters to move forces. Due to the constant UAS threat, any large movements are easily targeted. Furthermore, vehicular movement has to stay on roads, especially near the line of contact, due to mines. It is the same with foot traffic.
Recommendations
During infiltration or any type of maneuver, subterfuge and good intelligence preparation of the battlefield will be extremely important. The Russians (and UAS in general) are not omnipotent and there are work arounds. If you look at some of the Ukrainian SOF initial cross border raids into the Kursk region of Russia, they chose crossing points poorly guarded or not guarded at all. Also there is still some traffic ongoing between the two sides.
SOF should consider using local partisans whenever feasible. In addition, there have not been any parachute operations that we are aware of. Part of the reason is the heavy air defense artillery presence along the line of contact. Any airborne operations would require misdirection, ruses, and suppression of enemy air defense systems. Waterborne infiltration and movement is another option. AFU SOF (and Russian SOF) has been very successful in the Black Sea with small boat actions as well as riverine operations throughout the country.
Of major concern, at least within the occupied areas of Ukraine, are collaborators and Russian sympathizers. Anything out of the ordinary is quickly reported to Russian occupation authorities.
During actual kinetic operations, SOF should rely heavily on obscuration through the use of smoke. It is recommended that any force conducting operations in Ukraine or against the Russians, carry more smoke grenades than they normally would. It will obscure UAS observation. Train to use smoke. Soldiers should understand how to read winds and adjust smoke usage accordingly, length of time to build up smoke, how long it will last, and the number of smoke grenades or rounds that are required for different terrain and missions. As mentioned above, the use of ruses and diversions will be critical.
Any vehicular movement should include counter UAS systems and operate in small teams of less than four vehicles. If operating well behind enemy lines, civilian vehicles are always an option. Again, this situation is where partisans and advance teams will be critical. Other options include silent electric bikes, ATVs, and motorcycles.
USSOF rules the night, but that will not necessarily be the case against a near peer such as the Russians. Most of the Russian airborne and SOF have advanced night vision and thermal capabilities, but other units do not always possess them. Intelligence will be critical when determining the capabilities of any opposing forces. Nighttime is still the best time to operate, but operators must assume that any UAS flying at night has infrared (IR) capabilities.
SOF is not impervious to minefields, so SOF will have to be equipped with mine detection equipment. That is not necessarily standard equipment in SOF and in the past has been something they only acquired as part of theatre provided equipment. SOF should also consider purchasing some of the emerging UAS and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGS) that can either detect or defeat landmines.
About the Authors
Erik Kramer is a Senior Fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations and co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. With over 33 years of military and government service, including time as a Special Forces officer, Kramer has been in Ukraine since 2022 advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He recently published his first book, American Dystopia: A Cautionary Tale, which uses fictional interviews to depict the United States two years after a societal collapse, exploring its impact on culture, the economy, education, international relations, and politics.
Paul Schneider is a former U.S. Special Forces Green Beret who volunteered to support humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. He has worked with nearly every type of Ukrainian Armed Forces unit, from Special Forces teams on tactical operations to Ukraine’s National Service Academy at the strategic level. Schneider is currently a senior foreign policy analyst and planner at Special Operations Command Pacific, where he develops plans for security cooperation, Special Operations campaigns, and Whole-of-Society Resistance Operating Concepts.
Coming Soon: Part II, Ukraine Lessons for SOF in LSCO – Fires, Drones, and Intelligence. Subscribe to the SOFX Report below to make sure you don’t miss it.
