The Unmanned Systems Fight in Ukraine: The Not So Quiet Revolution

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, in a recent white paper entitled “Evolution Not Revolution, Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine,” which has been widely distributed throughout the U.S. Air Force, states that the widespread introduction of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) throughout Ukraine is not a revolution, but a part of an evolution in warfare. I have spent the past two years in Ukraine training and advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine and can unequivocally state that the introduction of unmanned systems to include air, ground, and surface is a revolution. Webster defines revolution as “a sudden, radical, or complete, change…a fundamental change in the way of thinking about or visualizing something: a change of paradigm…a changeover in use or preference especially in technology.” It also defines evolution as “a process of change in a certain direction…a process of continuous change.” Words matter, and the main difference between revolution and evolution is time; a quick change or a slow change. Unmanned systems in Ukraine have resulted in immediate and systematic changes to the character of warfare the likes of which the world has never seen. A note of caution, analysts and experts must be careful to glean the applicable lessons learned from Ukraine and realize when a lesson only applies to that war. From my own personal observation and experience, unmanned systems (to include air, ground, and surface) have drastically and, in a short period of time, affected almost every aspect of warfare in Ukraine in a profound way and will continue to do so in other future conflicts.

Unmanned systems are affecting warfare and every domain¹ and many of the capabilities that the U.S. and its allies take for granted. This paper is broken down into two parts: part one discusses the warfighting domains and how unmanned systems have affected them; while part two discusses how U.S. dominance in the different domains can no longer be taken for granted; even with our superior capabilities.

Part I: Unmanned Systems and their effect on the warfighting domains:

Air

The use of UAS in the air domain has evolved from just a platform for conducting reconnaissance and kinetic missions against ground targets to an actual threat against airborne aircraft. Allegedly, on July 31, 2024, Ukrainian UAS just took down a Russian helicopter in flight for the first time. While UAS vs. aircraft is in its nascent stages, it will become more and more of a threat as both the Russian and Ukrainian capabilities improve. It is just a matter of time before UAS becomes a constant threat to aircraft.

For the very first time in the world, #Ukraine military used FPV drones to shoot down a helicopter! This happened at #Kursk when they used a FPV drone against a Mi-28 attack helicopter of the #Russian Aerospace Forces! See the video👇 pic.twitter.com/ZbgFVWzdYv
— Babak Taghvaee – The Crisis Watch (@BabakTaghvaee1) August 7, 2024

Mass matters. In many of the Ukrainian and Russian unmanned attacks, they have used mass to achieve desired effects to overwhelm defensive measures. No matter how effective counter UAS measures are, any current systems can be overwhelmed.

Ukrainian drone startups are experimenting with swarming technology. UAS swarm capabilities are defined as the ability for drones to operate semi-autonomously as a group. They are also developing visual recognition software that could easily identify aircraft. This technology is based on artificial intelligence (AI) and there are some reports that Ukraine has already used AI-enabled UAS in combat.² Both sides are using massed drones to destroy critical infrastructure as well as strategic air assets far away from the line of contact. UAS are used to achieve both strategic and tactical effects in the air domain. Their use has resulted in both sides having to protect aircraft on the ground from attacks even thousands of kilometers from the line of contact.

One final note about the air domain, combat search and rescue over enemy territory is nonexistent for both sides.

Land

On land, both sides are experimenting with unmanned ground systems (UGS) for resupply, medical evacuation, kamikaze attacks, reconnaissance, and kinetic attacks with mounted machine guns. The first ground “drone vs. drone” battle just took place.³ In Ukraine, it is just the beginning of the UGS revolution. Soon UGS will be performing some of the riskiest and most important missions such as demining, logistics, and evacuation of casualties.⁴ The Armed Forces of Ukraine also recently received robotic “dogs” with an anti-thermal coating. They are using them for risky reconnaissance missions where their low profile and “stealth” coating makes them difficult to detect.

The Ukrainian military has begun using a robotic scout dog to assist in various tasks. This robotic device aids in reconnaissance, conducting operations, and gathering intelligence on the battlefield. This new technological tool enhances the capabilities of the military and… pic.twitter.com/nsI8Y5GGpN
— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) August 10, 2024

Currently, adherence to the “Golden Hour” for medical evacuation is nonexistent. Nothing moves on the battlefield during daylight due to the UAS threat, forcing medical evacuations to wait for the cover of darkness. It requires a change in paradigm for frontline medics. They must be able to stabilize and treat casualties for up to 24 hours before they can receive definitive care.

UAS has affected massed, combined arms attacks above the company level. The Ukrainians are conducting ground attacks in platoon plus size elements. Anything larger is a target for unmanned systems. They tried to conduct combined arms operations during their 2023 counteroffensive to no avail. Their attack was quickly stalled due to a combination of unmanned systems attacks, artillery barrages, and minefields.

Tanks and armored vehicles are vulnerable to UAS. First, UAS will identify them, then another drone will cause a mobility kill (or in conjunction with artillery, whose fire is corrected using the UAS feed), and finally a first person view (FPV) UAS operator will send an explosive-laden drone down the hatch to target the vehicle crew as they attempt to evacuate.⁵ Even though some experts assert the accuracy rate is less than 50%, mass and sheer numbers matter and overcome issues of accuracy.

A small Ukrainian FPV drone did a lot of damage after flying into a Russian tank.
Mariinsky direction. pic.twitter.com/1tTFgWSWcj
— TOGA △ (@TOGAjano21) June 8, 2024

Ukrainian special operations forces (SOF) are conducting unmanned systems strikes as part of almost every operation they do. They have become very adept at incorporating unmanned systems into their operations. The use of unmanned systems has been a force multiplier for SOF as discussed below and have used them very successfully in the Ukrainian campaign against the Russian Navy.

Sea

Ukraine, with a navy of only 11 vessels, have managed to defeat the Russian Black Sea fleet and push them out of the Black Sea, thereby opening sea corridors for grain shipments. The Ukrainian Navy claims that they have sunk or disabled a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to include the Fleet’s flagship, the guided missile cruiser, Moskva.⁶ Ship numbers matter during war and the larger navy usually wins. This is obviously not the case in Ukraine and is clearly a revolution in naval warfare. Ukrainian unmanned surface drones are even using missiles to counter aircraft and other drones.

💥 Ukraine’s domestically-produced Sea Baby naval drones equipped with Grad MLRS rocket system are now active. pic.twitter.com/CySIst7mYZ
— Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) May 23, 2024

Cyber/Space

Both Russia and Ukraine are operating seamlessly between the various domains. It is surreal to see Ukrainian cyber warriors in a dirt trench conducting cyber attacks using UAS to identify Russian military headquarters and hacking into surveillance cameras in occupied areas.⁷ Starlink satellites have become critical for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are using them as well. The Ukrainians rely on them for drone operations as well as communications. Starlink’s strength is its small size and sheer numbers. It is difficult to jam with so many satellites flying overhead. Electronic warfare is used on both sides, but in this author’s opinion, Russia has the advantage and can shut down global positioning systems and communications very effectively. Drones have been used as communications retransmission relays for other drones as well. Cyber and electronic warfare attacks from drones have yet to be seen, but it is not a stretch to imagine the development of that capability.

Part II: American historical dominant capabilities vs. Unmanned Vehicles; the game has changed…

Domination of the air

UAS might not be able to dominate the air, but they can dispute it with sheer numbers. U.S. doctrine is to quickly suppress enemy air defense systems, but with the use of swarming techniques, even the most advanced aircraft could be overwhelmed. Many U.S. tactics, techniques, and procedures that the U.S. military takes for granted such as: large airfields with aircraft parked in the open; forward arming and refueling stations in open fields; sprawling, above ground forward deployed headquarters; and combat search and rescue operations with an acceptable risk level can no longer be taken for granted. It will require a paradigm shift.

Reliable, timely, and secure logistics

The U.S.’s long, relatively uncontested supply chains can no longer be taken for granted. They are extremely vulnerable to unmanned attacks and are usually some of the U.S.’s lesser protected assets. Everything from the movement of supplies to their actual storage will have to be reevaluated.

Static indirect fire assets

In Ukraine, indirect fire assets such as HIMARS and artillery are very vulnerable to being surveilled by UAS and quickly targeted. The U.S. military must learn to displace these systems in a matter of minutes. Static artillery or rocket systems will not survive.

Battalion and above combined arms maneuver

Large scale battalions and above ground operations using armored vehicles and tanks are extremely vulnerable to drone attacks. The combined effects of UAS attacks, artillery barrages, and minefields will diminish U.S. combined arms maneuver capabilities and could stunt the speed and tempo of U.S. ground operations. Expect large losses of personnel and equipment; losses that the U.S. military (and American people) would consider catastrophic and unacceptable. U.S. ground forces should consider a more modular approach with more robust combat arms companies and platoons that can operate autonomously with no communications due to electronic warfare.

MEDEVAC

The U.S. military can no longer rely on the Golden Hour as the standard for emergency medical evacuation of our wounded personnel. The U.S. will have to train frontline medics to sustain casualties for up to 24 hours. It will also affect the type and quantity of medical supplies required on the frontlines.

Mission Command

Large headquarters or multiple, above ground building headquarters as well as large airfields are extremely vulnerable and should be considered a thing of the past. The U.S. military must significantly down-size these headquarters and reduce the electro-magnetic signature as well as disperse and go underground.

Large ships

Large surface vessels are vulnerable to swarm attacks by unmanned systems that will overwhelm any defensive measures. The U.S. Navy must develop a layered approach to countering UAS and make it part of their doctrine. The range and payloads of unmanned aerial, surface, and subsurface vessels will only increase as battery and fuel consumption becomes more efficient.

Recommendations:

– Disposable/expendable/adaptable drones need to be the norm, not the exception down to the platoon level. Airmen, Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers are still operating under the paradigm that drones are sensitive items that cannot be lost or destroyed. By comparison, Ukraine reportedly had lost 10,000 drones by May 2023.⁸ This author has spoken with many different units and I believe the Ukrainian military is losing over 40% of their drone fleet weekly. Many of them are kamikaze drones as well.

-Mass still matters. Overwhelming numbers of drones, minefields, artillery, and soldiers still make a difference and can negate superior capabilities. The U.S. military needs to take that into consideration with procurement of drones, mini-satellites, and artillery. Technology can help minimize the number of soldiers needed, but the battlefield is still a numbers game.

-Counter UAS systems must be employed at least at the squad level or to a security force airman who is patrolling an airbase perimeter while deployed.

-One size does not fit all when it comes to countering UAS. It takes a layered, constantly adapting approach to fight UAS to include both kinetic, non-kinetic, and passive protection. Those companies that offer only one way to counter drones are wrong-headed. For every counter drone piece of technology or tactic, the enemy WILL develop a counter in short order.

-Consider incorporating unmanned systems with manned systems to include manned aircraft to lessen the risk to human life and to counter enemy drones.

-Drone warfare has changed the speed of warfare. When a soldier identifies a drone, he has just seconds to decide what to do. He does not have time to consult a digital library to determine friend or foe nor does he have time to request permission from his chain of command to “shoot/don’t shoot.” Every service member should know what to do when they encounter a drone and counter UAS system operators must be empowered to make immediate decisions.

I just spent two weeks with a U.S. Army unit during an exercise where I served as an allied force’s brigade commander. I saw first-hand the U.S. Army’s UAS and counter UAS capabilities. The U.S. ‘s capabilities at the operational and tactical levels as well as the mentality to fight this new kind of warfare are not even close to what they need to be to match Russia’s capabilities and capacity. The U.S. military still thinks that it will have time to identify friend or foe, explain to someone in a soldier’s chain of command who is not present in the situation, and then choose a kinetic/non-kinetic option. By the time you see a drone on the battlefield, you have seconds to react. Do you seek cover? Do you try to engage it? Or is it a friendly drone?

I ask one basic question of every military unit that I advise, what is your UAS battle drill? I have yet to find a U.S. Army unit that has an immediate answer. There are no simple solutions. Only one thing is restricting the payload of unmanned systems and that is fuel/battery life. The only restriction to unmanned system’s capabilities is the imagination.

This article was authored by Erik Kramer, Senior Fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations and co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. Kramer has over 33 years of military and government service, including his time as a Special Forces officer, and has been in Ukraine since 2022 advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He just published his first book, “American Dystopia-a cautionary tale.” Through a series of fictious interviews with a cross section of Americans, the book shows what the U.S. would look like two years after a collapse and how its demise would affect every aspect of life to include culture, the economy, education, international relations, and politics. Edited by Noah Schmidt, Editor at SOFX.