What would we do when Russia used nuclear weapons in Ukraine? My organization was training a Ukrainian special operations unit in the fall of 2022, when one my instructors approached me and asked the question that had been bothering him. Would we evacuate? If so, where? Did we have access to basic protective equipment and medicines? Kyiv was awash with rumors about a pending nuclear strike. Social media showed an exodus of Ukrainians leaving Kyiv. Iodine and anything vaguely rumored to counter radiation sickness was sold out. For the citizens of Ukraine, the threat was imminent, not some politically veiled threat. For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis and flareups between India and Pakistan, the possibility of a release of nuclear weapons was a reality.
The U.S. is in a new Cold War with China and Russia whether we want to be or not. The indicators point to a conflict in the future possibly with China if not others. There are glaring differences from the first Cold War such as the strong economic ties between the U.S. and China compared to the minimal trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but the sooner the U.S. and its allies accept the reality and start to rapidly emplace the checks and balances and systems that prevented World War III, the less likely a direct confrontation will take place. It has to be a deliberate and collaborative process and just raising tariffs, conducting measured official visits to Taiwan, wearing Ukrainian flag pins, and banning TikTok will not cut it.
The Evidence
The Cold War was a conflict over ideas and ideologies. The democratic bloc of the U.S. and its allies versus the Soviet Union. The same is happening today with authoritarian powers in China and Russia (as well as their erstwhile allies in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) on one side and the U.S. and its allies in NATO and throughout the world that mostly are democratic nations (with some notable exceptions) on the other side. The authoritarian narrative is that democracies are inefficient; do not protect their people; force their liberal ideas and values on others; and are not reliable allies. They point to the divisions in the U.S., our messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, and our vacillating support to Ukraine. The Western counternarrative is that yes, democracy is messy, but it protects individual freedoms and ensures majority rules, but the rights of minorities are protected. Our openness translates into a free market which leads to a better way of life and standard of living for our citizens.
The Cold War was fought through the battle of the narrative and proxies. The rationale was that direct confrontation between the superpowers would lead to a nuclear exchange and global annihilation of our species. Basic game theory that was taught in political science classes showed that mutually assured destruction was guaranteed. The major proxy wars of the Cold War, the Korean War, the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, the countless conflicts on the continent of Africa, interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan were all part of the larger “fight” between the West and the East. We are seeing similar proxy wars today.
The war in Ukraine is a prime example. In Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mind, it might have started based on a twisted view of history, but it has become so much more than that. It has become a battle over whose view of the world will dominate the 21st century and whether a nation-state can still choose its own destiny without another country attempting to annihilate them, because they disagree. The world saw the precursor to that in the Republic of Georgia and are seeing stirrings of it in Moldova. In Asia, you are seeing it what has happened with Hong Kong and the deconstruction of democracy and self-determination there. You can also see it in Taiwan which is the new Berlin of this Cold War. China is trying to squeeze Taiwan into submission through threat of force as well as propaganda. Taiwan has been forced to walk a tight-rope between independence and an uneasy coexistence while avoiding provocations.
One major difference from the Cold War is that the battle of ideas is not over the economy. All sides have basically agreed that a free market works, but the governmental controls, such as government owned businesses, direct government interference in larger corporations, and currency manipulation, which never completely left the economies of China and Russia, are creeping back into the economies of the China and Russia. Old habits die hard.
The Cold War tools of propaganda and information operations have become even become even more central in this new Cold War due to the internet. Social media serves as a global bullhorn for the spread of disinformation and propaganda. It is relatively easy to hide the origins of a message and as social media usage as well as ideological differences have spread in the U.S., often the message originates in the U.S. and the Russians (and now the Chinese) just amplify it. It is also incredibly challenging to attribute the damage that propaganda causes. Just look at the Russian spread of disinformation through the internet in the U.S. 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. Analysts cannot directly point to a cause and effect from information operations, but the influence is there. Furthermore, the Chinese have replicated the way the Russians exert influence through information operations and expanded on it.
This new Cold War also relies on economic persuasion and coercion. It’s evident in China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). According to the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 150 countries participate out of the 195 UN recognized countries. Of course, there have been many notable issues with the BRI such as the economic “handcuffs” they place on some participants and the negative environmental impacts, but it is still a widespread and successful engagement program. In contrast USAID has programs in more than 100 countries. Both programs are about competition for garnering influence, no matter how you package them. In other areas, that “competition” takes on a more sinister form.
One area that has the potential to dangerously deviate from the old Cold War model is nuclear arms proliferation. At the start of the Cold War, which arguably was acknowledged by the West during Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946, there was only one country with nuclear weapons. By 1964, there were five countries with nuclear weapons (China, France, Russia, UK, and U.S.). By the end of the Cold War, nine countries had nuclear weapons, the original five plus India, Israel (who has never acknowledged that they have nuclear weapons), Pakistan, and South Africa (who officially acknowledged that they had nuclear weapons, but subsequently dismantled them in the early nineties). North Korea developed and tested nuclear weapons in the 2000s.
During the Cold War, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the acknowledged nuclear armed countries developed a system of treaties and organizations to keep in check the number of nuclear weapons as well as prevent any further proliferation. President Putin pulled out of the New START Treaty on February 21, 2023, and now there are no nuclear arms control agreements in effect nor are there any efforts to restart them. It is the first time in 50 years that there has not been any arms control agreements in place.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the U.S. followed an unwritten “playbook” when it came to nuclear weapons. The messaging between the superpowers was very intentional and deliberate to avoid any misunderstandings. That tacit agreement is no longer in effect as evident from Putin’s veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Furthermore, China is increasing the size and efficiency of its nuclear arsenal and has developed a triad system of delivery. According to a 2022 Pentagon report, China will quadruple the number of nuclear warheads to 1500 by 2035. They have never been party to any nuclear arms control agreements. A new nuclear arms race is already happening. The U.S. Department of Defense and Energy in 2023 embarked on a $247 billion (about $760 per person in the US) ten years modernization plan to update all “legs” of the nuclear triad. Also, Russia announced modernization plans for its arsenal as well as causing an uproar recently by a “leaked” announcement that they were possibly developing a nuclear armed, anti-satellite weapon. The nuclear arms race is unfortunately back on and is completely unchecked.
Power hates an imbalance. The unipolar world of American hegemony that has existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been the exception. Multipolar and bipolar worlds have been the norm since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th and 18th centuries. One could argue that the current polarization of the world is a natural rebalancing of power into some semblance of order. Regardless of the international relations’ theories, the U.S. cannot just stand idly by while these changes occur. The international system of the overlaying web of alliances, international organizations, treaties, and agreements that were put into place after World War II to prevent another world war have not changed significantly. The U.S., its allies, and its adversaries must implement changes to the international order and systems that keep pace with the times. Complacency or self-imposed isolation is not the answer and is frankly not an option. The world is going to engage with the U.S. whether we want to or not.
The Answer
By the end of the Cold War, the layers of alliances, agreements, treaties, and international organizations that helped keep the peace have gone into a kind of stasis. They need to be revised, discarded, or renewed. The new realities are that the world needs systems emplaced that will prevent a conflict between the West and its competitors. It is a fact that the current political realities in the U.S. are skepticism towards international institutions and commitments. This renewal will serve as a forcing function for the U.S. government to assess its international commitments from military to support of international organizations. The U.S. government needs to undertake a deliberate process to evaluate what it considers its diplomatic, military, and economic commitments and interests worldwide versus its capabilities and capacity. Then develop an implementation plan that will require hard choices. The reality is that the world has changed since the post–World War II international system was emplaced and the system and the U.S.’s roles in it, must change as well. What follows are some viable solutions.
The ineffectiveness of the UN has become a punchline. It is well known for being mostly talk, even though in reality it has a wide mandate that has helped many people. To make it more effective, the Security Council needs to be revamped. It needs to add permanent members from the Global South. It is a matter of fairness. Furthermore, the voting procedures need to be changed so that one permanent member cannot block everything. Any one veto from one of the permanent members, China, France, Russia, U.S., or UK, stops the whole decision-making process. The updated version should add in permanently a country from Africa, the Middle East, South America, and two “members at large” that are voted in every four years by the General Assembly. Security Council decisions should require a “supra–majority” of 7 out of 10 “yeses” for decision-making.
These changes will strengthen the UN and give it credibility. This idea is controversial and there are times that votes will go against the U.S. national interest, but it will prevent an individual nation-state from neutering decisions for the common good. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has used its veto 35 times, China has used its veto 17 times, and the U.S. has used its veto 21 times. France and the UK have not used their veto power once since the end of the Cold War. The individual veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council is the major reason that the UN is ineffective when they are needed most. The UN should also conduct a pragmatic and transparent review of funding to ensure the costs are equitable across all member nations. Furthermore, if the UN has more authority and flexibility during world crises, it lessens the constant need for direct U.S. participation.
I have spent the past 18 months in Ukraine training and advising the Ukrainian Armed Forces. I also worked and lived side-by-side with the Russian Army in Bosnia during the late nineties and was part of a U.S. Army study of the Russian Army in Ukraine during 2017. In the early nineties, I was stationed in Europe when the Soviet Union collapsed and saw the dilapidated Russian Army barracks and Russian soldiers selling their uniforms just so they could afford to live. I have a good understnading of how the Russian government and security apparatus operates and what motivates them. They are an immensely proud people and many of them feel wronged, slighted, and humiliated by U.S. actions since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It still does not justify Putin’s attack on Ukraine. Putin is a bully, plain and simple. Bullies only respect and fear one thing, credible force. The debate over countering Russian aggression is discussed in the press and through governments, think tanks, and talking heads on a daily basis so I will not delve into it here. I will just make one point; this new Cold War is a battle over ideas and the fight in Ukraine is battle over the idea that a country and its citizens have the right to self-determination. If you visit Kyiv, you can tell that it is a country and a people that want to be part of the West and are dying for their cause. Why would we not support them? The world and China are watching what we do in Ukraine and a withdrawal of support will have negative consequences globally and for the U.S. that we cannot even predict. The fight in Ukraine is part of this new Cold War which we dismiss at our own peril. We pay now, or we pay later.
The U.S. should also consider developing a NATO-like mutual defense organization in the Pacific to serve as a permanent counter to Chinese aggression (similar to the defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO] which was in existence from 1954-1977). Potential membership could include Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the UK, and the U.S. with possibly India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. It will ease the heavy lifting that the U.S. Navy does in the Pacific and will create a formal burden sharing agreement. Also it will formalize the U.S.’s “shift” to the Pacific instead of focusing only on bilateral agreements and create possibly closer ties between countries that traditionally have had frosty relations such as Japan and South Korea.
The U.S. military is trying to organize, equip, and train to deter and fight these challenges, but it is a tale of pockets of success as well as misguided initiatives. The Marine Corps’ controversial change in its structure and focus to more of a supporting effort for the US. Navy as well as decentralized, highly mobile operations with precision fires, is the right direction. The U.S. Army’s move away from the brigade combat team as the unit of action to the division as the unity of action is concerning (a U.S. Army brigade is commanded by a colonel and consists of 3-4 battalions with approximately 5000 soldiers and a division is commanded by a major general and consists of 3-4 brigades and approximately 15,000 soldiers). As evident in Ukraine, operations are much more decentralized and dispersed when everything a military unit does is under enemy observation and precision fires. The Army and Marine Corps have different missions, but reconfiguring forces so that most of your major assets such as fires, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are pulled up to a higher headquarters away from brigades and battalions is wrong-headed. I recommend a relook at these major structural changes to focusing on a more nimble and modular combat force. Just like large army command posts in the field present a juicy target, so do aircraft carriers. Due to the increasing range and lethality of Chinese weapons, aircraft carriers will have to pull further and further away from the likely area of conflict, the South China Sea and possibly past Guam which decrease their response time as well as aircraft “loiter” time due to increased distances and the need to refuel. On the other hand, the U.S. Air Force has increased its ability to conduct dispersed, expeditionary operations through the development of hardened facility outposts throughout the Pacific. Furthermore, the Department of Defense downsizing of special operations forces (SOF) reportedly up to 3000 support personnel shows a lack of understanding of what SOF does. In the conventional fight, SOF are a supporting effort and help shape operations and partnerships; especially before the fighting starts. Counterterrorism missions that have been in the forefront of the U.S. conflicts for the past 20+ years are only a small part of SOF’s mission set. The largest SOF organization, U.S. Army Special Forces’ forte is working with partner forces to build relationships and enhance their capabilities. Also, warfare has gotten extremely complex and requires niche skills that take years to develop. The positions on the chopping block include cyber personnel, psychological operations forces, etc. which are critical to the future fight. Again, the U.S. military must prepare for the realities of the future fight, not try to tailor the fight to fit legacy systems and structures.
The restructuring of the new Cold War international checks and balances should include a financial component too. The U.S. should reinvigorate the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The original agreement included 12 countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the U.S.). The agreement was so appealing that China asked to join. The negotiations started under Republican President George W. Bush in 2008, but President Donald Trump cancelled the deal because of concerns over currency manipulators, lack of tariff protections, and loss of manufacturing jobs to overseas markets. The remaining 11 countries did enter into the agreement and left open the possibility of the US. joining at a later date. President Joe Biden mentioned the possibility of renegotiating the deal during his 2020 presidential campaign, but it has gone nowhere.
The restructuring of the new Cold War international checks and balances should include a financial component too. The U.S. should reinvigorate the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The original agreement included 12 countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the U.S.). The agreement was so appealing that China asked to join. The negotiations started under Republican President George W. Bush in 2008, but President Donald Trump cancelled the deal because of concerns over currency manipulators, lack of tariff protections, and loss of manufacturing jobs to overseas markets. The remaining 11 countries did enter into the agreement and left open the possibility of the US. joining at a later date. President Joe Biden mentioned the possibility of renegotiating the deal during his 2020 presidential campaign, but it has gone nowhere.
The U.S. won the first Cold War in large part to our economic power. The TTP would provide a very strong soft power instrument to counter the Chinese global economic initiatives such as the BRI. The countries within the TTP represent 40% of the world’s total gross domestic product (GDP). One projection predicted that U.S. membership would increase the U.S. GDP by .5% by 2030 ($130 billion). There are valid concerns that the TTP could result in lost jobs in the U.S., but the U.S. could renegotiate the deal to better protect American workers. TTP is a win-win for the U.S. both economically and strategically in its competition against China and would further align several Asian countries with the U.S. instead of with China.
The initiatives that I listed above are mostly a multi-national line of effort approach to the new Cold War. There must be a direct engagement line of effort with the Chinese as well, and that is through creation of multiple crisis hotlines with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Multiple hotlines at various levels of command can help alleviate misunderstandings during conflicts or potential military clashes. These hotlines should not just be at the Secretary/Minister level, but down at the Global Combatant Command (GCC) level as well. The Chinese have a history of not answering the phone during crises, but that does not mean you do not put these measures in place. Also summits between leaders of the U.S. and China should be the norm and a regular occurrence as well as pushing for arms control agreements to include China.
I am not naïve; the Chinese have not been receptive to discussing arms control and U.S. relations with Russia is at an all-time low. It will take a huge diplomatic effort to reinstitute arms control agreements, but worth it. Arms control agreements during the Cold War stopped the race to build more nuclear weapons and reduced the total nuclear stockpiles in the Soviet Union (and Russia) and the U.S. The Cold War high of 70,000-plus nuclear warheads globally in 1986 has been reduced to approximately 27,000 total which includes all nuclear powers (with 97% of that stockpile in U.S. and Russian arsenals). Arms control works.
Space is an area for potential cooperation. It is an extremely expensive endeavor, but even at this low point in U.S./Russian relations, cooperation in space is still ongoing. I see declining U.S./Russian cooperation in space as a “tripwire” indicator for deteriorating relations. The U.S. does not have to have a joint space station with China, but there are plenty of other areas of space exploration for cooperation and pooling of resources. Chinese and American collaboration in space could be one small step to lessening tensions.
These “answers” are imperfect solutions to an extraordinarily complex problem. Doing nothing or withdrawing from world affairs will just exacerbate the issues and eventually draw the U.S. in whether we want to be involved or not. A contemporary example is the U.S.’s “withdrawal” from the Middle East and then its involvement in the Gaza/Israel War.
Conclusion
Putin said in the aftermath of his reelection that he would create a “buffer zone” in Ukraine. “We will be forced at some point”…”to create a certain “sanitary zone” on the territories controlled by the Ukrainian government.” One can only speculate what that “zone” will look like, but it is not a stretch to imagine another Korean DMZ or Berlin Wall scenario dividing eastern Ukraine from the rest of the country as well as from Europe.
This new Cold War is different from the original Cold War and world leaders and policy makers must understand the differences and apply new solutions to fit the problem; not just recycle old approaches. China and Russia are not true allies and are suspicious of each other. There is a lack of trust and are more partners of convenience than comrades-in-arms. Furthermore, their relationship is not balanced. China’s economic might dwarfs Russia’s economy and the overall “balance” tips towards China.
The U.S. won the Cold War, because our ideology worked better than the twisted version of Communism that the Soviet Union espoused. Americans were united in the fight against Communism. As a result of our ideas and our unity, our ideas translated into a free market economy, and we bankrupted them. After the Cold War ended, the existential threat was no longer there and over twenty years later, U.S. internal divisions seem insurmountable. However, the potential is back with a vengeance. Now the U.S. is facing two major nuclear powers instead of one. Countering the threat from China is something that all Americans can get behind. The U.S. can still win the battle of ideas, prioritize efforts and assets on internal problems, and lessen the burden through cooperation, collaboration, and collective security with other countries, not isolationism. The U.S. learned these lessons the hard way during the world wars of the 20th century. It is folly to have relearn them.
About the Author
Erik Kramer is a senior fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations (NCUO) and the director and cofounder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group (UDSG) in Kyiv. Since July 2022, he has trained the Ukrainian Armed Forces in various tactics and operations. With over 33 years of military and government service and five years in the private sector, Erik previously directed training for The Mozart Group and served as Executive Director of Special Ops Survivors (SOS). He also founded Emerging Technology Institute (ETI) and served with the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG). Erik coauthored the “Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook” and has written extensively on national security issues. A retired Army Special Forces lieutenant colonel, he served in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Congo, Iraq, and Kosovo. He recently published his first book, “American Dystopia.” Erik holds degrees from The Citadel and the Naval Postgraduate School and resides in Charleston, South Carolina.
